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[The following sermon was preached in Rockefeller Memorial Chapel on July 5, 1959, by Dr. W. Barnett Blakemore, Jr. Dr. Blakemore, of the Federated Theological Faculty, is Associate Professor of Practical Theology and Dean of the Disciples Divinity House.—EDITOR.]

MY ENEMY—AND MY BROTHER

MANY centuries ago in a faraway Eastern land, two companies of people were traveling toward a rendezvous. One company was made up entirely of men on horse. They bore weapons. They could maneuver quickly and deploy themselves to best advantage for defense or attack. Their strength was obvious, as was the fact that they had ridden out from a community of some wealth. Their leader was traveling without any sense of fear, secure in his leadership and untroubled in his conscience.

The second company was made up of men and women and children traveling with all their possessions. They had with them herds of cattle and flocks of sheep. It was the season when these beasts were being delivered of young. This, too, was a community of some wealth which had been able to afford many children even among the servants. The well-fed youngsters were robust, but together with the calves and lambs they slowed the pace of the company to a minimum and robbed it of maneuverability. The resulting vulnerability of this company haunted its leader, and the more so because in earlier life he had twice deeply offended the leader of the troop which he knew was approaching him. Retreat was impossible because this second company had not left behind an amicable situation. The coming rendezvous was inevitable, and its character was unpredictable. Men and women and children, goods and chattels and beasts, all the values of the community, had to be in jeopardy.

Twenty years earlier the leaders of these two companies had parted. At the parting he who was now the leader of the troop of horsemen had sworn that at their next meeting he would slay the other man who had twice deceived him. On the eve of their meeting again, Jacob separated his people into several groups, hoping to minimize the disaster he feared his brother Esau might visit upon them. For the two leaders were Jacob and Esau, brothers between whom there was no longer any brotherhood. If their meet-

ing were to prove that kind of union which may be called "brotherly," it could not be taken for granted in advance. But the conditions under which Jacob and Esau were approaching each other define the circumstances out of which brotherhood and peace have always been achieved in the past and out of which they must be achieved in our own day or in any future. The gaining of peace and concord, the progress that may come through the larger associations of men, are not easy works established out of some primordial condition of goodness but are won out of desperate situations. They are constantly bought anew at the price of jeopardy and vigilance in the midst of portents of disaster.

Like Jacob of old, the moment we ask, "Who is my brother?" we answer, "He is my enemy." Or, "Who is my enemy?" "He is my brother." Every brotherly relation is one in which there exist the factors which could make for great enmity. And every situation that is one of true enmity is fraught with the very characteristics which could bless the contenders with fraternity.

For men to be either enemies or brothers means that they have already a shared history. No two brothers in the world ever grew up without occasions of mutual offense. If their mature years are characterized by concord and cooperation, it is because there occurred something that is much more than the natural outgrowth of the childhood phase of sibling rivalry. In the years of adulthood it is equally impossible to live without giving offense. Every fraternal relationship long sustained is not marked by an unbroken placidity. Instead, as offenses have come, from elsewhere has come an aggressive intention to regain the values of concord. There has developed some habitual exercise of forgiveness which has quietly worked its reconciliation.

The histories of men and of nations who have lived in proximity to each other are full of events which could be remembered as offensive. In all the world's history no score has ever been evened off. No punishment has ever exactly fit any crime, nor has any man truly paid his debts to society. No war has ever settled anything, and almost any issue over which men have once fought can be revived to embitter a future strife. It is against such a background that the world's peace must constantly be refashioned. In this world we never start from scratch in these matters of relationships, either personal or national. The record is never clean and fresh. Peace and accord must always be rebuilt in the midst of ambiguities, prejudgments, misunderstandings, and bias.

The task of avoiding conflict is never so simple a thing as the mutual discovery by each other of the men of good will on both sides. No doubt, in the face of any sharp issue, there are men of good will on both sides, but the discovery of each other by those who are fundamentally friends before they ever meet will not preserve peace. Its preservation depends upon that encoun-

ter between potential enemies which results in their discovery of each other as brothers. Such a discovery is characterized by the resolution of whatever bad conscience standing between them has created their enmity. And it is always difficult to know where the bad conscience lies and who can resolve it.

In the case of Esau and Jacob the bad conscience was not in Esau, who had been robbed both of his birthright and of his father's blessing. When that second event had occurred, Esau had become full of wrath and vowed to destroy his brother. But that murderous intent had long since left him, and any sense that he had been wronged had been emotionally neutralized. He had not cared to cherish his wrath, and it had long since ceased to eat at his soul and health or to motivate him. It was a spiritually free man who was riding out with his horsemen to that meeting. But it was not so with Jacob. His soul was in torment.

Centuries later, Jesus of Nazareth was to realize and to say that offenses, like occasions of stumbling and temptations, cannot be avoided, but woe unto the man who causes them. Such a man lives in double distress. He fears that his offense has aroused the ire of his brother, creating the possibility of conflict—and his ability to face the conflict is daunted because he knows himself to be guilty of its cause, and, by offending his brother, he has already offended himself.

It is not only that enemies and brothers alike have a shared history. My brother, like my enemy, is someone who has "something on me," as the saying goes. He knews me very well. He is one who knows my weaknesses and my strengths. A brother is particularly one with whom there can be no sham or bluff. He will neither overestimate your badness nor underestimate your strength. Because of that he will exist as a constant challenge to you to do as well as you can. He will see behind every mask and despise all role-playing. He will identify every pretentious escape from reality by which you seek to make life comfortable. Brothers constantly make life uncomfortable by keeping us from being anything other than ourselves, and, in so doing, they are their brother's keepers. In his Divinity School address, Ralph Waldo Emerson warned the graduates that he who dissimulates goes out of acquaintance with himself. My brother, because he knows me very well, restores my self-acquaintance. It is always disquieting, because, no matter who we are, we have personal elements which are difficult and demand self-discipline and strong self-restraint if they are not to hamper our lives. The brother who knows us so well inhibits our adoption of those artful dodges by which we seek escape from the continuing repentance and reform which honest self-understanding would require. Such brotherly acquaintance may no longer be exercisable by a blood brother who we have not seen in many years, but any man is fortunate if he has gained such an acquaintance with another and is

blessed if he can be free enough to allow it. For such intimacy is often what we try to avoid. To grant it to another is in some respect to put our life in his hands. Unless he is truly a brother, he now knows that by which he could destroy us. He might, so to speak, "pull an inside job" and ruin us, involving us beyond our desire or let in his unwelcome schemes. Yet to fail to risk intimacy is to live isolate and unknowing of one's true nature and possibilities for good and evil.

A third similarity between my brother and my enemy is that both are in some way equal. Any man who is not on an equality with me is hardly my enemy. If I am in some way stronger than he, our relationship does not have enmity and brotherhood as its poles but some other categories, such as master and servant, professor and student, doctor and patient, or parent and child. No, for a man to be my brother or my enemy is to stand about level with me. My brother stands about where I stand. My enemy stands over against me but about level. This is why the parable of the Good Samaritan, which so properly describes my neighbor, does not tell me who my brother is. One of our favorite perversions of this good parable is to suppose that in all our relationships we can be as the Good Samaritan, a good neighbor dispensing aid to those who are stricken. But the respect of sensitive and thoughtful men is not gained by a benevolence restricted to the idea of just enough aid out of our store of wealth to alleviate the pains and pangs of the enfeebled.

A truer philanthropy, and the one which gains stronger men for its exercise, is that which intends far more. The significance of the Marshall Plan was its intention to pass beyond feeding the hungry and clothing the naked of postwar Europe to the re-creation of a Europe strong as ourselves. The power of the Four Point programs is their purpose of creating national strength where previously there was national weakness. The virtue of these programs is that they envision new strengths equal to our own.

In the long run, we can build future greatness only by aiding in the creation of strengths which may in some future day be either a brother or an enemy. In that intention we move everything that we as a people have loved into jeopardy. If the new strength becomes our enemy, the world as we have known it dies. If the new strength becomes our brother, the world as we have known it reaches new glories beyond our imagining. Yet we cannot fail to run the risk.

A world of continuing inequalities would inevitably be a world of strife. And, while equality of strength cannot guarantee peace, it is ultimately a prerequsite to it. In unity there is strength. Yes. But it is only between strengths that there can be true unity. Every empire that has sought to perpetuate itself by keeping its dependents weak has exhausted itself upon their

weakness. Every alliance with weakness degrades except that alliance which intends to endow the weak with new and strengthening dignity. Despite the duty of the Christian to tend the sick and shield the weak, he cannot afford and is under no command to accept the indignity of relationship with those who wilfully cherish their frailty. There are times when he must shake the dust of a place from his shoes or turn away from the will that magnifies weakness by ignoring its own dignifying strengths and potentials. The Christian's duty to another man or another nation is to aid its health and wholeness and to create that which cannot be created without dread—the equal who knows one very well and who shares an ambiguous past out of which accord and harmony must constantly be won at the price of the jeopardy of all one values and loves.

Yet it is out of such stressful circumstances that life moves from strength to strength. And there is, in this world, no place outside this area of tension which is worth inhabiting. To fail to join the issue is to slide back into decay; and it is sheer insanity to believe that one can live above the battle of life's issues. This is a very distinguished university, and therefore in spite of itself it attracts a small proportion of students who mistakenly believe that, once they have scaled the heights of a Chicago Ph.D. degree, they will be forever ideologically invulnerable—methodologically safe at least, if not possessors of ultimate truth. One meets them in later life, quite insane because in some moment when they did not even realize that they were truly challenged they were confounded, probably by a Bachelor of Science from some obscure vocational school of agriculture and mining. Such graduates are few; the vast majority recognize true challenge when it comes and know that it may come from anywhere.

In every area of life a challenge to our mode of existence may come from anywhere—and, when it comes, it is like an enemy. But, if the truth is with him who challenges rather than with you, he is your brother, though you do not so recognize him. Or, if the truth is shared between you, you are brothers who must discover each other. The character of an enemy is that he destroys you because in his eyes you are wrong. The character of a brother is that he judges you but only as he himself expects judgment and correction.

Brotherhood is characterized not by lack of encounter but by encounters which are corrective rather than contentious.

The advancement of knowledge comes through dialogue between opposed points of view. Decision is sought not by brilliance of wit but by the discovery of truth, by the intensification of observation and experiment, on the one hand, and the hypothetical and theoretical integration of ideas and concepts, on the other.

Our sensitivities and tastes are refined not by the endless representation to us of forms which we already acknowledge as beautiful and good but by the presentation to sight and sense of new perspectives and visions. That does not mean that anything new is automatically beautiful or good. It does mean that every position that is willing to be in serious dialogue must be heard. Certainly, we need pay no attention to those who "never like to listen but dearly love to speak" or to those always willing to be an audience but never to risk an opinion. But to every serious presentation we must pay attention, however painful and threatening to ourselves personally the encounter may initially appear to be.

Our faith is never secure if we cannot risk encounter between our own ways of stating the faith and other ways of stating what may be that same faith. This is a distinction that goes beyond the need of discussion between the denominations or between orthodoxy and liberalism. It calls also for dialogue between belief and doubt. He is not truly Christian who so defines the Holy Spirit in conventional terms that he cannot discern it or at least entertain the possibility of its presence when it bears another name, even though that name be non-Christian.

It is the tragedy of our lives that too often we mistake strong challenge for the enemy when it is our brother. Thinking it is our enemy, we start to fight. If we recognized our brother, we would strive not against him but with him in a mutual search for that which is right. When we pass from enmity to brotherhood, conflict is abolished, but competition remains, albeit transmuted into encouragement and exhortation as we provoke and stir each other to good works and love. In brotherhood contest does not disappear; it becomes zestful and keen as its life-renewing possibilities replace its potential for destruction. We pass from the psychology of war to the psychology of the game.

It is written that on the night before Jacob met Esau, after Jacob had settled his folk in their camps, he sought sleep beside the brook. But in the night he found himself wrestling with an assailant in a struggle that proved equal and unending. Ere morn came, Jacob found himself asking his assailant for a blessing. It was given, but only as the assailant touched Jacob's thigh in such a way that he became halt. It is as if Jacob had recognized in his assailant a brother who could bless him, but only when he gave up his pretensions and walked very humbly.

And in the morning "Jacob lifted up his eyes and looked, and behold Esau came, and with him four hundred men. And Jacob divided the children unto Leah and Rachel and the two handmaids. And he put the handmaids and their children foremost, and Leah and her children after, and Rachel and Jo-

seph hindermost. And he passed before them, and bowed himself to the ground seven times, until he came near to his brother. And Esau ran to meet him, and embraced him, and fell on his neck, and kissed him," and together they wept for joy.

Yet I have misled you if you have taken the lesson to mean that there can always be a happy ending—that if you do such-and-such, or if you work out a particular diplomacy, or make some very judicious approach, or come to your enemy as a brother, he will become your brother. Indeed, I must tell you that you can never know whether he will prove to be your brother or continue to be your enemy. You can know only that it is ultimately God's intent to bind strength to strength, to bring all peoples unto himself in a house of prayer for all nations.

"Thou hast heard that it was said of old, 'Thou shalt love thy neighbor and hate thine enemies,' but I say unto you that you shall love your enemies." This is the world's hardest instruction. He who thinks that the Sermon on the Mount preaches an easy ethic or that the requirements of Christianity are soft should look again. Is it not against all nature and all want to love one's enemies? Certainly.

But the time has come when men have taken into their hands the prime force of the universe. This new possession makes man feel in some degree godlike. Tragically enough, having laid hold of this power, we could not now relinquish it without loss of dignity. Having entered the atomic age, we have made a new idea of ourselves, and it would be death to will a return to any earlier conception of man. This new idea of man's strength fills us with great hope—and also awakens great dread. But we cannot turn back. We can only live confronted by those who know what we know, who are strong with this new power as we are strong with it, and with whom we share ambiguities regarding each other because of our historic attitudes toward each other. My enemy—or my brother?

"You have heard it hath been said of old, 'Thou shalt love thy neighbor and hate thine enemies,' but I say unto you that you shall love your enemies, that you may become the sons of God." To become the sons of God and therein to discover your brotherhood—this is, indeed, the word which in our day brings liberty and independence from those fears which would tyrannize our times: this understanding that in the midst of enmity itself are the very characteristics out of which brotherhood may emerge; that in the same man is both my enemy and my brother. God grant unto us both the discovery of our brotherhood.

W. Barnett Blakemore, Jr.

MAN OF THE YEAR

CITATION

EUGENE EXMAN, book-publisher, author, and editor, born in Ohio, a graduate of Denison University (Ph.B. 1922) and of the Divinity School, University of Chicago (M.A. 1925); honored by Middlebury College with the degree of Doctor of Religious Education (1952);

A major figure in the publication of books on religion, who began his publishing responsibilities at the University of Chicago Press (1925–28); became manager of the religious book department of Harper and Brothers in New York City in 1928 and has continued his association with Harper's since that time; a director of Harper's since 1944 and a vice-president since 1955;

Who in association with Harper and Brothers has been responsible for the publication of hundreds of significant studies in the field of religion, among the most noteworthy of which have been sixteen volumes from the pen of Harry Emerson Fosdick, with whom he has worked closely throughout the years; whose religious sensitivity, editorial acumen, and breadth of learning have greatly contributed to the quality of the books subjected to his judgment, and whose own religious and cultural understandings have found expression in numerous writings;

A churchman and Christian statesman, active in the Riverside Church of New York City since 1929, where he has served on several boards and committees; a member of the Board of Managers of the American Bible Society; of the Board of Governors of Wainwright House, in which responsibility he has taken responsible leadership in the Laymen's Movement for a Christian World; for many years a trustee of Denison University; a member of the Executive Committee of the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, Inc.; a counselor for the Albert Schweitzer Education Foundation and author of *The World of Albert Schweitzer* (1955);

A loyal alumnus and friend of the Divinity School who has assisted many of its faculty members, alumni, and students in their research and publication; whose high standards of research, scholarship, and Christian commitment have brought honor to the Divinity School;

Has been selected by the Trustees of the Baptist Theological Union to represent the alumni of the Divinity School of the University of Chicago at the Annual Dinner to the Federated Theological Faculty, Wednesday, October 14, 1959.

ACCEPTANCE OF THE AWARD

During my last year at the Divinity School, I became convinced of my vocation of editor and publisher. Through Professor Theodore G. Soares, I met Mr. Donald P. Bean, then director of publications of the University of Chicago Press. To these men, and to Dean Shailer Mathews, whose counsel was freely given, I owe much for the direction of my publishing career.

Scholarship and publication go hand in hand, and in this partnership it has been my privilege to work. Of the many men, now living and of revered memory, who have contributed to my efforts I am deeply conscious. Even on the human plane, one's work is never done alone, and the point at which one man's contribution ends and another's begins is never clearly marked. Truly we are "bound in the bundle of life."

I greatly appreciate the honor of being selected by the Trustees of the Baptist Theological Union to represent the alumni of the Divinity School of the University of Chicago at the Annual Dinner to the Federated Theological Faculty, Wednesday, October 14, 1959. I regret that my absence from the country makes it impossible for me to attend the dinner in person and request the Dean to give my felicitations and best wishes to faculty, alumni, and students who will gather on this happy occasion.

EUGENE EXMAN

LONDON, ENGLAND

FROM THE DEAN'S DESK

CONVOCATION

At the Summer Convocation on August 28, 1959, the following degrees were conferred:

I. IN THE DIVINITY SCHOOL

FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS:

DARREL ELVYN CHRISTENSEN
A.B., Hastings College, 1945
M.Th., Southern California School of Theology, 1957
Three papers in the field of Christian Theology

LARRY FRANK WALTMAN
A.B., Miami University, 1957
Three papers in the field of Religion and Art

II. IN THE FEDERATED THEOLOGICAL FACULTY

FOR THE DEGREE OF BACHELOR OF DIVINITY:

In co-operation with the Chicago Theological Seminary:

DONALD GENE STONER
A.B., Ball State Teachers College, 1956
Under Generalized B.D. Program

In the Divinity School:

MARION GEORGE DECKERT
A.B., Bethel College, 1956
Thesis: "The Nature of Poetic and Religious Language in the Thought of Philip Wheelwright"

M. EDWARD HUNTER
A.B., Indiana University, 1953
Thesis: "Sin and the Fall, as Seen in Hawthorne's *The Marble Faun*"

In co-operation with the Meadville Theological School:

HAROLD JOHN LEVESCONTE, JR.
Thesis: "The Moral Basis of Theology: A Study of the Religious Thought of Harold Powell Davies"

III. IN THE DIVINITY SCHOOL

FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY:

MILDRED KITTO BILLINGS
A.B., University of Chicago, 1916
Thesis: "The Thought of Horace Bushnell Considered in Relation to That of Samuel Taylor Coleridge"

THOMAS LOUIS HANNA
A.B., Texas Christian University, 1949
D.B., University of Chicago, 1955
Thesis: "The Lyrical Existentialists"

ROBERT EDWARD MCBRIDE
A.B., Indiana Central College, 1948
D.B., Bonebrake Theological Seminary, 1951
Thesis: "A Study of the Philosophy of History in Selected Contemporary Theologians, with Specific Reference to the Writings of Reinhold Niebuhr, Henry Nelson Wieman, and the Process Theologians"

[Joseph M. Kitagawa, who has been teaching the History of Religions in the Federated Theological Faculty of the University of Chicago since 1951, was engaged in research in Eastern religions in Asia during the academic year 1958–59 for the Inter-Religious Study Program of the Federated Theological Faculty, subsidized by the Rockefeller Foundation. He is the editor of *The Comparative Study of Religions* (posthumous publication of Joachim Wach [Columbia University Press, 1958]), *Modern Trends in World Religions* (the 1957 Paul Carus Memorial Symposium [Open Court Publishing Co., 1959]), and co-editor (with Mircea Eliade) of *The History of Religions: Essays in Method* (University of Chicago Press, 1959). His forthcoming book, *Religions of the East* (Westminster Press), is based in part on his recent research trip. He has contributed "The Church in Relation to Non-Christian Cultures" (May, 1953), "Joachim Wach: Teacher and Colleague" (November, 1955), and "The Nature and Program of the History of Religions Field" (November, 1957) to the DIVINITY SCHOOL NEWS. The following paper was presented at the annual Roger Williams Fellowship Conference at the Divinity School on November 3–5, 1959—EDITOR.]

SEARCH FOR SELF-IDENTITY

ASIAN PEOPLE TODAY

Travelers who visit Asia nowadays cannot help feeling that something significant is happening in the life of the people there. Those who knew Asia before World War II invariably comment that Asians have changed, not so much in the way they dress and live as in the way they feel and talk about themselves and about others. Call it the "spiritual revolution" or the "revolution of rising expectations," if you will; there is definitely something new in the air. Externally, Asia has not changed much, except for the conspicuous absence of Westerners in high places and a few other indications that colonialism is a thing of the past. On the surface, the new Asia has many old landmarks. The sight of teeming populations, for example, is nothing new, and the great metropolises—Bombay, Calcutta, Rangoon, Bangkok, Saigon, Hong Kong, Manila, and Toyko—were there long before the war. But the way people talk and the way they approach life are in marked contrast to their prewar attitudes. People are no longer as leisurely as they once were; they seem to be in a terrible hurry. One has the impression that they are excited about something, and they look hopeful. Even those who sit on the roadside do not appear idle. They chatter as though they had found a purpose in life.

These impressions become increasingly strong as you talk to people. Not only politicians, businessmen, journalists, labor leaders, and students but simple shopkeepers and farmers also talk as though they were on the main stage of world history. Once on a ferry between Hong Kong and Kowloon, I overheard a conversation between two middle-aged clerks about the significance of Nasser for the world scene. What struck me was the fact they were both well informed about world affairs. In Rangoon, I met an elderly, yellow-robed monk who, in the course of his exposition on the Buddhist approach to human relations, hotly denounced the segregation in Little Rock. He knew what was going on in North America, South Africa, and other parts

of the world. I must confess I was a little surprised when a waiter in a Nepalese restaurant voiced his approval of the betrothal of a commoner to the crown prince of Japan. Little did I realize that people in this isolated country on the slopes of the Himalayas felt so strongly about events in other lands. In Colombo a taxicab driver volunteered his opinion as to why the late Mr. Solomon Bandaranaike, then prime minister of Ceylon, had left Christianity and become a Buddhist. In Calcutta a barber was hopeful that a summit conference would be held in order to ease world tension, and a bearded man at a typewriter shop in New Delhi expounded to me what Sikhism could offer to the "materialistic" West. Such experiences, trivial though they may sound, at least awakened me to how people in Asia feel about what is happening in other parts of the world and in their own midst.

After listening to many people in all walks of life and in different Asian countries, I was suddenly struck by the fact that their words seemed to have a common theme. The settings are different, and the traditions are different, but they all have more or less the same message. At first I was irritated by such stereotyped expressions as the "materialistic West" and the "spiritual East," the "failure" of the West and the "sacred duty" of the East to save the world from a possible destruction by man-made weapons. But then it dawned on me that what they were driving at was not so much a denunciation and criticism of others as a sort of thinking aloud about themselves, about their own hopes and fears. When they talked about their proud heritage of the past, they really meant that their future must be grounded in their religious and cultural traditions. "To us Buddhists," said a monk in Japan, "history starts tomorrow." Certainly, Asians are proud of what they are doing, and they need little encouragement to formulate opinions, positive or negative, about themselves or about others. How can we account for such a mood, attitude, and ethos among present-day Asians? This was the question that intrigued me as I traveled through various parts of Asia last year.

There are undoubtedly many different explanations and interpretations of the present mood of the peoples in Asia. Many people attempt to interpret it in terms of the influence of the West upon the East. For example, according to Toynbee, the drama of modern world history has two main actors, the "West" and the "rest of the world." During the last four or five hundred years the West was the aggressor: "It is the world that has been hit—and hit hard—by the West." But in recent years the tables are being turned; the West is being attacked by Russia and China, who are becoming new aggressors. "The West's alarm and anger at recent acts of Russian and Chinese aggression at the West's expense are evidence that, for us Westerners, it is today still a strange experience to be suffering at the hands of the world what the world has been suffering at Western hands for a number of centuries past."[1] I am inclined to believe that such a "villain-and-good-guy" theory *à la* western

[1] Arnold Toynbee, *The World and the West* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 4.

movies, useful and suggestive though it may be, does not do justice to the depth and complexity of the spiritual struggle of the people in Asia.

There are many difficulties involved in our attempt to understand and interpret Asia and the Asians. For instance, we have many preconceived notions about them, such as the oft-repeated and widely held "myth" of the unity of oriental culture. Admittedly, there are some important similarities between, say, the cultures of India and China, but, historically, with the exception of the Buddhist expansion from India to China, these two great cultures developed quite independently of each other. In the main, Asia witnessed the development of several autonomous cultures existing in juxtaposition, and there was little feeling on the part of each culture that it belonged to a greater unified cultural tradition that might be termed "oriental culture." Even the satellite cultures of India or of China maintained relative autonomy and insularity. While we have to resort to such general terms as "Asian peoples," "oriental cultures," and "Eastern societies," we must use them with the full realization that they are general terms, referring to greatly diversified phenomena.

Second, we must bear in mind that each one of the cultures and peoples in Asia has a long history. Although Asians do not share the Westerner's understanding of the meaning of history, they can never forget their own histories. Asians, whom Westerners tend to think of as "Völker von ewigen Stillstandes," have had eventful careers. The history of Asia has its share of war and peace, revolutions and counterrevolutions, the rise and fall of empires, invasions and migrations, prosperity and poverty, religious awakening and spiritual bankruptcy. Asia defies simple characterizations; the "spiritual East," represented by Gautama, Confucius, and Gandhi, also produced bloodthirsty warriors like Genghiz Khan and Timur Lane. Nevertheless, the cultures and societies in Asia have managed to preserve their *Lebensgefühl* despite numerous social, political, and cultural changes throughout the ages. While the modern West has exerted a decisive influence on the East, this does not imply that the contemporary situation in Asia is only a chapter of the expansion of Western civilization. Unfortunately, many books available in the West today suffer from this type of Europocentric obsession. We must make a conscious effort to interpret what has taken place in Asia in the modern period in relation to the historical development of Asian cultures and peoples.

Third, we must remind ourselves that Western categories and Western modes of thinking are not the best or most reliable tools for our attempt to understand the religions and cultures of Asia. This does not mean that there are no universal elements in human experience and cognition. All men everywhere go through the same cycles of life, such as birth, naming, initiation, marriage, sickness and recovery, war and peace, death and burial. But the ways of structuring these experiences are not the same universally. As Lily Abegg points out (*Ostasiens denkt anders*), Asians have their own perspectives from which they interpret the events of life and the meaning of history. Those who believe in the transmigration of souls

feel the sorrow of parting just as much as anyone else, but they certainly will never say, "O death, where is thy sting?" In fact, "to be raised incorruptible from the dead" is not good news to those who are trying to be delivered from the chain of birth and rebirth. Thus, in order to "understand" Asian peoples, their religions and cultures, one must enter as much as possible into the very structure of their thought and spiritual experience, and this takes more than a sheer intellectual endeavor. Unlike Westerners, who try to grasp the nature of an object "objectively," Easterners are preoccupied more with the act of knowing, or the state of consciousness and cognition, than with the object as such, because to them "knowing" is another form of "being." That is why our effort to "understand" Asians involves a total understanding, implying a sort of *metanoia*.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Today, we frequently hear about the "resurgence of Eastern religions" and the "march of nationalism" in Asia. To accept, as I do, these characterizations does not necessarily imply the acceptance of a simple cause-and-effect theory, for example, that Eastern religions were overpowered by Western culture during the colonial period, and now, as the weight of the West is being lifted, Eastern religions are reasserting themselves with the help of nationalism. Such an observation may partially explain the external factors involved, but it misses the deeper dimension of the agonizing spiritual struggle of the Asian peoples. I call this underlying spiritual struggle the "search for self-identity."

All of us have some sort of image of who we are and what we are. We are members of our family, community, and nation, and we are heirs of some cultural and religious traditions. We have names; we can identify ourselves, and we can be identified. We know how to act, how to greet others, and how to treat others. We have a sense of what to do and what not to do in various situations. We have pride, a sense of self-importance, and we respect others' sense of dignity. From time to time we have bad moments, disappointments and failures, but we cling to our own image of who we are and what we are; we know we belong! Also we have some basic affirmations about life and the world. Everyone has, wrote Carlyle, "the thing a man does practically believe and this is often enough without asserting it even to himself, much less to others, the thing a man does practically lay to his heart, and know for certain, concerning his vital relations to this mysterious universe, and his duty and destiny there." Our own image of ourselves and our sense of self-identity are related to, and sustained by, our basic affirmations about life and the world.

Asian people have always had an image of what they were and who they were, although their sense of self-identity has not always been clearly articulated. For example, a man in traditional India may have wondered why he was born into the priestly caste or the outcaste. He no doubt asked searching questions about the mystery of life as he encountered personal crises. But his self-identity was never a serious problem to him because he knew he had a definite place in the world. His daily labor may have been

boring, but he knew it had to be done. Life to him was not a series of decisions. The fact that he was born was not his own decision. The die had been cast by something other than himself. What was needed was his decision to follow the prescribed course of life, fighting against boredom, monotony, and weariness. He had little sense of being an individual; he was essentially an insignificant part of a community in which he was needed and wanted. "From the very first breath of life, the individual's energies are mastered, trained into channels, and co-ordinated to the general work of the super-individual who is the holy society itself."[2] His family, his caste, and his community embraced three kinds of members—past members who are no more, present members who are living, and future members who are to come into being. Man also, according to Hindu orthodoxy, is not superior to nature; he is an integral part of nature itself. Running through the mysterious universe and the world of nature and man is the cosmic, eternal law (dharma), which dictates, sustains, and guides every aspect of human life. Traditional Hinduism provided its people with such a secure sense of self-identity.

The traditional Chinese also had their image of who and what they were. Their sense of belonging was defined in terms of family relationships, because the family was the center of the society, nation, and universe. Even ethics was based on the reciprocal relationships learned in the family. Once a prince praised the uprightness of a son who, when his father stole a sheep, bore witness against him. To this prince, Confucius commented, "In our part of the country, those who are upright are different. The father conceals the misconduct of the son, and the son conceals the misconduct of the father." Men and women, old and young, masters and servants, knew how to behave, talk, and live in this co-operative commonwealth. The author of *Fousheng Liu Chi* ("Six Chapters of a Floating Life") describes his wife:

> As a bride, Yün . . . was never sullen or displeased, and when people spoke to her, she merely smiled. She was respectful towards her superiors and kindly towards those under her. Whatever she did was done well, and it was difficult to find fault with her. When she saw the grey dawn shining through the window, she would get up and dress herself as if she had been commanded to do so.[3]

That she acted as though she had been commanded is significant, because she had a clear image of who she was and what she was expected to do at all times. Thus, when she met a lovely singsong girl, Yün secretly arranged to have her own husband take this girl as his concubine and became literally sick when someone else snatched the girl away. "Life is like a spring dream which vanishes without a trace," so wrote an ancient Chinese poet. Yes, individual life vanishes like a spring dream, but what is important is the continuity of the greater life of the family, embracing both the living and the dead.

The fact that peoples in traditional Asian societies once had a secure sense

[2] Heinrich Zimmer, *Philosophies of India,* ed. Joseph Campbell (New York: Pantheon Books, Inc., 1951), p. 155.

[3] Lin Yutang (ed.), *The Wisdom of China and India* (New York: Random House, 1942), p. 971.

of self-identity meant that their cultures were based on certain metaphysico-social principles. The values—religious, cultural, political, economic—were kept in balance in unified value systems, which were believed to be grounded in the cosmic laws, that is, *Dharma* in India and *Tao* in China. In this collectivistic scheme each individual had a definite place, but his value as an individual was defined by the status he held, which was not to be questioned. For example, a man had to behave as a father to his son, as a husband to his wife, as a son to his own father, and as an employer to his employee. The status did not require efficiency or productivity so much as loyalty and conformity to the prescribed roles. An individual felt secure because he held statuses and he had roles to play, and except in emergency situations these roles and statuses were to be respected. Old age was respected not because an old man was necessarily wise or capable but because he held the status of father, of grandfather, or of great-grandfather and elder in the community. In this connection it must be remembered that the East understood social and political institutions to be rooted in the "natural," which in turn is identified with the "original." William Haas astutely observes: "The East admits no reason, no *logos,* in opposition and superior to the natural. The natural possesses, so to speak, its own reason. And it is the part of human wisdom to recognize and submit to it."[4] In this "immanental theocracy" the religious ideal is to "return" to the pristine past, to restore the original harmony of values, and to be united with the Real. Furthermore, the empirical societies are imperfect manifestations of the original community, and the only way to improve the societies is by restoring the original metaphysico-social principles.

Here lies the root of the Asian type of "interiorized messianism," which implied an ultimate self-salvation (*Selbsterlösung*). But the self did not mean self in the modern Western sense. Individuals did not matter. The importance was the accumulation of values and the transmission of these values from one generation to the next within the larger self, which was the holy society. Ancient Hindus, for example, might have adapted the Johannine phrase (4:22): "Salvation is for the Hindus," but they would not have added, "Salvation is *from* the Hindus." The significant exception to this in Asian religions was Buddhism, which never quite lost its missionary character, even though, in many parts of Asia, Buddhism became closely identified with local cultures and societies.

Each Asian society had its traditional priests, who were guardians of the social institutions and systems and transmitters of saving knowledge. A noteworthy example was the Brāhman caste in India, which was intrusted with the harmonious operation of the cosmos and all its component parts. While rituals and dogmas changed with time, the metaphysico-social principles were regarded as immutable by Hindu orthodoxy. In Buddhist countries the monks were bearers of the religiocultural and social values, and in the Shinto tradition of Japan the priests performed this function. In China the

[4] William S. Haas, *The Destiny of the Mind —East and West* (London: Faber & Faber, 1956), p. 69.

class of scholars (the *Ju,* commonly referred to as "Confucian scholars") shouldered this responsibility. It was the sacred duty of these "priests," regardless of whether or not they were so classified in the ecclesiastical institutions, to master the saving knowledge of the past, to transmit it to the present generation, to guard the social institutions, and to interpret contemporary experience in the light of accumulated wisdom. According to Confucius:

> A *Ju* lives with the moderns but studies with the ancients. What he does today will become an example for those in the generations to follow. When he lives in times of political chaos, he neither courts favors from those in authority, nor is boosted by those below. And when the petty politicians join hands to defame or injure him, his life may be threatened, but the course of his conduct may not be changed. Although he lives in danger, his soul remains his own, and even then he does not forget the sufferings of the people.[5]

So long as these "priests" maintained their rapport with the people by interpreting their contemporary experiences and problems in terms of the accumulated wisdom of their tradition, the people had a sense of mental security; they had their own image of who and what they were. The long history of Asia records many men of creative insights and noble visions who had lasting influences on the life of the people; it also records how these creative impulses were rigidified, institutionalized, and eventually lost. All religious and cultural traditions have experienced ups and downs, as well as periods of reform, revival, renaissance, and revolt. With the gradual stratification of societies, and the changes in social, political, cultural, religious, and economic values, the Asian peoples found it extremely difficult to maintain the traditional sense of self-identity. This became particularly apparent after the fifteenth century A.D.

The disintegration of Asian cultures was a complex phenomenon. Here we can only state that the slow process of internal stagnation in Asia was accelerated by the advance of the West during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The traditional ideal of the East was the integration of all values and the balance and harmony of the diverse elements within the society, as illustrated by the reciprocal principles of Confucian ethics and the middle-way principle of Buddhism. Such an ideal presupposed the existence of a certain fluidity and flexibility within the ordered society. In the old days the people, whether they were agrarian or pastoral, lived close to nature. Despite floods, famines, wars, and pestilence, which plagued them from time to time, people had a sense of security in their identification with the land and their membership in their communities. The order of society was maintained not so much by police or army but mostly by a strong sense of allegiance to traditional authority. In most cases the elders of the community guided and arbitrated but did not coerce. Even kings and emperors ruled mostly by customary powers, sanctioned primarily by religious authority.

The fluidity and flexibility of Asian cultures were lost with the stratification of society, the stagnation of cultural values, and the institutionalization of reli-

[5] Lin Yutang (ed. and trans.), *The Wisdom of Confucius* (New York: Random House, 1938), p. 6.

gious systems. Furthermore, the ruling classes superimposed political values upon all other values. This was the case with the Moghul rule in India, the Manchu rule in China, and the Tokugawa rule in Japan. The rulers did not reject traditional religions and cultures. On the contrary, they actually supported them in many ways; the Brāhmans in India, the monks in Buddhist nations, the scholars in China, and the Shinto priests were given special prerogatives and social prestige. But at the same time religion had to bow to political authority. For example, the Manchu rulers in China saw in Confucianism "not only a practical philosophy for the masses, but a broad foundation upon which they might base their theocratic, paternal, and autocratic powers. . . . The happy and prosperous state, as pictured by the Manchus, was one built on the filial respect and blind obedience of the people."[6] These rulers, by confining religious leaders to the domain of "religion," denied the very function which the Brāhmans, monks, scholars, and priests traditionally fulfilled, namely, transmitting the spiritual and cultural values and interpreting the contemporary experiences of the people in the light of the accumulated wisdom. Instead, it was the rulers who claimed this "priestly" function of interpreting the nature and destiny of the people. Inevitably, the traditional pattern of culture was disrupted, and peoples' images of who they were and what they were became confused; they were no longer certain about their own self-identity.

[6] Paul E. Eckel, *The Far East since 1500* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1948), pp. 53–54.

ASIANS IN THE MODERN PERIOD

The encounter between the East and the West in the modern period must be seen in its historical context. We are not concerned here with the moral implications of Western colonialism but are only trying to understand the minds of Eastern peoples as they came in contact with Western civilization. In retrospect, it is evident that the peoples, with their confused images of themselves, and the cultures and societies stagnating from within, could not halt the onslaught of Western civilization. The most significant outcome of the meeting of the East and the West was the development of three kinds of people in Asia—the new intelligentsia with Westernized education, the old, or traditional intelligentsia, who resented anything new or Western, and the masses.

It must be noted that the influence of the West was felt differently in different parts of Asia. For example, in Japan and China, their own leaders (i.e., the Meiji reformers and the pioneers of the Kuomintang led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen) attempted to "utilize" Western learning and technology without losing their traditional cultural values. On the other hand, in India and other parts of Southeast Asia, Western colonial administrators attempted to "transform" the traditional cultures by means of Western education and institutions, as was explicitly stated in Macaulay's directive in India to educate "Indians in blood and color, but English in taste, in opinion, in morals, and in intellect." Nevertheless, in both cases the "new intelligentsia" with Westernized education claimed to be the new "priests," interpreting their people's contemporary experiences not with

the accumulated values and wisdom of Asia but with cultural, social, economic, and political values of the West. Inevitably, there resulted what Ananda K. Coomaraswamy has called "the separation of literacy from culture," whereby those who were educated were uprooted from their ancestral ways of living and beliefs, while those who preserved traditional cultures could not adjust themselves to new situations.

The new intelligentsia in Asia were passionate converts of Western civilization, with its promise of a secularized salvation. Their theology was democracy, and their sacred scriptures were science. Consciously and unconsciously, they inhaled the messianism of modern Western civilization, which had a "strange compound of genuine idealistic responsibility, blindness and hypocrisy, with a strong dose of will-to-power as the basic component."[7] It must be noted, however, that these new Asian intelligentsia were not the vanguards of Western colonialism. That some of them were manipulated and used by colonial administrators cannot be denied. But in their own minds they were passionately Asians. Nevertheless, they were dedicated to the cause of reforming the disintegrating oriental cultures and societies with the new gospel of salvation—liberty, equality, fraternity, democracy, and modernity. With the passion of new converts they re-examined the traditional image of Orientals about themselves as reflected in the mirror of Western civilization. They were astonished at the discrepancy between what they potentially could be and what they then were. They were not naïve iconoclasts; they wanted to offer a new sense of identity to their people, who were burdened by the dead weight of hollow customs and traditions. Thus commented V. Sriniva Rao:

> Our present-day social practices are no doubt the natural outcome of certain religious beliefs. Unless such beliefs are shaken, the present social practices cannot be permanently shaken. If an attempt is made, as has till now been made, to shake the present-day customs, without previously or simultaneously attempting to shake their foundations deep-rooted in religious beliefs, the result cannot be otherwise than what it is at present, viz. a creation of many halting and half-hearted "sympathizers" of social reform, who accept one reform and oppose another, evidently oblivious to the fact that the same root principles underlie all the reforms and are opposed to the principles that gave rise to the existing social customs.[8]

Similarly in China, Confucianism was mercilessly attacked by the new intelligentsia. Wu Yü went so far as to characterize Confucian filial piety as a "big factory for the manufacturing of obedient subjects." Dr. Hu Shih dares to state: "In the last two or three decades we have abolished three thousand years of the eunuch system, one thousand years of foot-binding, six hundred years of the eight-legged essay, four or five hundred years of male prostitution, and five thousand years of judicial torture. None of this revolution was aided by Confucianism."[9]

In this connection it is a matter of great interest that some of the new Asian in-

[7] Haas, *op. cit.*, p. 303.

[8] Quoted in J. N. Farquhar, *The Crown of Hinduism* (Oxford: Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press, 1913), p. 110.

[9] Quoted in Wing-tsit Chan, *Religious Trends in Modern China* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1953), pp. 17–18.

telligentsia embraced Christianity. While we do not intend to deal with the problem of Christianity in Asia, we may briefly note the inevitable conflict between the orientation of the Western missionary and that of Asian Christians. While the Western missionary worked toward the goal of Christianizing (and be it noted that this often implied Westernizing) Asians, some of the Asian Christians regarded Christianity as a means to reform and reconstruct their own sense of self-identity. These Asian Christians tried to be "liberated" from the meaningless religious and cultural values and practices which they had known, but they had no intention of allowing themselves to be "uprooted" from their own culture. The tragedy of modern Christian missionary work in Asia lies in the fact that the spiritual struggles of such Asian Christians as Kanzo Uchimura in Japan were not understood by the leaders of the missionary enterprise.[10] All too often, those who blindly conformed to the mores of the "mission compounds" were taken as genuine converts, while those who attempted to relate Christian faith to the indigenous culture and history were accused of not making a clean break with the pagan past. As late as 1928 a delegate at the International Missionary Council conference at Jerusalem went on record: "These [non-Christian] religions are going to be smashed anyhow, perhaps not quickly, but surely, and what is going to do it . . . is modern science, modern commerce, and modern political organization."[11] The subsequent developments in Asia make it clear to us now that someone misread the timetable.

Under the impact of the West, and by the dedicated effort of the new Asian intelligentsia, Asian societies began to have a new look. Gone were the traditional social and political institutions, and with them many of the cultural and religious values and beliefs. The traditional role of elders as arbitrators in communal affairs was taken over by salaried government officials who could enforce new laws. The old system of education, intrusted to religious institutions, was replaced by the new public education system. The proud old aristocrats had to yield to the new rich who represented a hitherto unknown economic system. Even the sacred domain of religion was invaded by the new Westernized scholarship, which dared to investigate critically and historically the sacred scriptures and traditions of Eastern religions. The organic relationships among the different segments of society were scorned as a legacy of the backward, feudalistic past. People were no longer evaluated by their status; they were regarded as individual human beings who had to fight for their own existence and social opportunity in a maddeningly competitive society.

Such radical social and cultural changes caused social and economic as much as mental and emotional upheaval for the traditional intelligentsia and the masses. All these modern institutions suc-

[10] Cf. Emil Brunner, "A Unique Christian Mission: The Mukyokai (Non-Church) Movement in Japan," in *Religion and Culture—Essays in Honor of Paul Tillich,* ed. W. Leibrecht (New York: Harper & Bros., 1959), pp. 287–90.

[11] *The Jerusalem Conference of the I.M.C.,* Vol. I: *The Christian Life and Message in Relation to Non-Christian Systems of Thought and Life* (New York: International Missionary Council, 1928), p. 366.

ceeded in destroying the old order of society without offering Asians a new sense of self-identity or a coherent view of life. In Burma, for example, "when the organic unity of the village was shattered, when external authority with penal sanctions was substituted for the authority inherent in a traditional way of life, the traditional guiding principle of social conduct was destroyed and there was nothing to take its place."[12] They felt as though they were foreigners in their own homelands, like Israelites in Egypt or in Babylon. "By the waters of Babylon we sat down and wept. . . ." It was not so much the resentment against the foreign aggressors, who did not come into direct contact with the people anyway, as the sense of bewilderment caused by not knowing how to act and what not to do in a strange society. Their resentment, mixed with a certain amount of admiration, was directed against the new Asian intelligentsia, who exerted a direct influence on their lives. This situation threw the masses and the old intelligentsia into each other's arms. Both groups were torn between the new wants they felt in this strange new world and the sense of nostalgia for the old order they continued to idealize, much as the hero of the novel *How Green Was My Valley* felt caught between two worlds. The old order of society was gone, and they had to find some meaning in the new—but how? "How shall we sing the Lord's song in a strange land?" The only thing they could do was to envisage the restoration of past glory at some future time; the remembrance and the expectation thus became united in their minds, and they began to feel that history would "start tomorrow."

The period covering the two world wars was a turbulent era for the entire world, and Asians, who were more or less compelled to sit on the sidelines, were interested spectators. After World War I they watched the emergence of two men, Wilson and Lenin, each offering universal programs of peace and plenty for all. Long before the tension between America and Russia became accentuated, these two alternatives became real options in the minds of Asians, as exemplified by the emotional conflict that haunted the life of Sun Yat-sen. But the Russian Revolution that Lenin inspired did not bring about a world-wide utopia for the oppressed, and the League of Nations that Wilson inspired did not wipe out Western colonial imperialism. The Arabs, the Indians, and the Chinese felt that they were betrayed by Western nations at the Peace Conference, and the Japanese were incensed by the exclusion act of the United States government. Deeply hurt by, and disappointed in, both the Russian and the Western alternatives, Asians were compelled to re-examine themselves and their place in the world.

In China the leadership of the Kuomintang, which was the revolutionary party founded by Sun Yat-sen, was taken over by Chiang Kai-shek in 1928, and he immediately attempted to turn the clock backward. What he called the "New Life Movement" was in effect a movement to restore Confucian values, which were supreme because they were Chinese. Hu Shih and many other new intellectuals were warned about their iconoclastic

[12] Margaret Mead (ed.), *Cultural Patterns and Technical Change* (New York: New American Library, "Mentor Edition," 1955), p. 33.

views, and all books in conflict with the ancient doctrines of the "rites" were banned. The ultraconservative tendencies of the Kuomintang drove many young intellectuals with no real sympathy for communism into the Communist wing because of the lack of any practical alternatives. No doubt the Kuomintang's decline was accentuated by a prolonged warfare with Japan, but at the same time it was also due to the fact that Chiang Kai-shek's romantic nationalism, based on Confucian traditions, had no relevant message for the masses. In Japan the liberal trend of the 1920's was followed by the militant nationalism of the 1930's. The Japanese militarists were convinced that they could use cannon, bombers, battleships, and other weapons of modern warfare to destroy the supremacy of the West. General Iwane Matsui, shortly before his execution as a war criminal at the Sugamo Prison in Tokyo, wrote: "Looking back, I have no regrets as I meet my death, nor have I anything to feel ashamed of before all creation, or before the Gods and Buddha. My deepest regret is that I was unable to realize Sino-Japanese Cooperation and a new life for Asia."[13] There is no question that Chiang Kai-shek and Matsui, as well as those who followed them, were sincere people, but they failed to understand the modern world in which their own people lived.

In India and other parts of Southeast Asia, the new intelligentsia, who had hitherto been regarded as faithful and useful citizens by the colonial administrators, began to demand political independence. They had little personal resentment or antagonism against Western civilization or Western cultural values, but they were set against the continued exploitation of Asia by the colonial powers. They freely admitted the East's debt to the West. The West introduced not only modern technology but also new types of social and political institutions to Asia. They even admitted that the colonial administration introduced a sense of social justice, but it could not possibly provide political justice. And the new Asian intelligentsia were willing to die for political justice. A Dutchman in Indonesia commented: "We trained only engineers and physicians, and they turned out to be politicians."

For that great cause of political justice, the new and old intelligentsia in Asia began to co-operate, and their combined effort was aimed at rectifying the political injustice imposed on them by Western colonial powers. Their temperaments were different, and they did not agree on many issues. But in their common struggle the old intelligentsia learned to use new methods and new learnings as weapons, and the new intelligentsia began to rediscover in themselves their deeply rooted kinship with their own peoples. Many Westernized intellectuals like Nehru began to find a new sense of value in their ancestral cultures, which they had hitherto forgotten and scorned. "We are citizens of no mean country and we are proud of the land of our birth, of our people, our culture and traditions."[14] Both the old and the new intelligentsia agreed on anti-Westernism as the goal

[13] Quoted in Shinsho Hanayama, *The Way of Deliverance,* trans. by H. Suzuki *et al.* (London: Victor Gollancz, Ltd., 1955), p. 256.

[14] Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India* (New York: John Day Co., 1956), p. 579.

and weapon of the mass movements. Anti-Westernism was not only a political slogan; it became a new gospel of salvation, and the masses found a meaning and a purpose for their lives in these movements. All the evils of society were blamed on the Western powers, and the masses in Asia were given a new sense of vocation as "collective suffering servants," as it were. They were not simply victims of greedy imperialists, mistreated and misunderstood, but they were, potentially at least, the bearers of a new gospel for the future, not only for their sons and grandsons, but also for the materialistic, warlike peoples of the West. We have no intention of belittling the genius and greatness of men like Gandhi, U Nu, and Sukarno; we only emphasize that their greatness was found in their ability to interpret the "messianic image" of the masses, so that the illiterate and the down-trodden would join forces with the intelligentsia in the struggle for political independence.

THE INTELLIGENTSIA AND THE MASSES

Now that political independence has been achieved by most of the former colonial peoples in Asia, the situation has changed radically. During the period of the struggle for independence, the old and the new intelligentsia, republicans, Communists, socialists, democrats, Hindus, Muslims, Buddhists, Christians, rich and poor, were united toward a common goal. They were willing to endure hardships and difficulties because they had hope in the future. In a real sense the achievement of political independence meant the end of a dream. It was one thing for the prophets in exile to go into ecstasy over the task of building a new Jerusalem. "Thus India gained her freedom but lost her unity," confessed Maulana Abul Kalam Azad.[15] The internal division cut deep into new nations in Asia. Each prophet and each party told the others: "You have nothing to do with our building a house for our God; we will build it ourselves" (Ezra 4:3).

At any rate, after World War II, many Asian nations gained independence—India, Ceylon, Burma, Indonesia, Vietnam, Malaya, the Philippines, and Korea. Mainland China emerged as a Communist state, and Japan was recently freed from Allied occupation. Each nation faces both internal and external pressures, politically, economically, socially, and culturally. The new nations in Asia, while rejoicing over their independence, realize that the era of a nation-state is over. Although none of them wishes to give up its national sovereignty, all of them feel the need of regional co-operation and collective security. This is the period of power blocs, and Asian nations, with the co-operation of African states, feel that they must develop some sort of unity to counterbalance the pressures of the Western and Communist blocs. Thus far, the Afro-Asian bloc, often referred to as the "Bandung Front," has maintained its existence only as a non-Western and a non-Communist (with the exception of Communist China) bloc, with very little of a positive nature to inspire and guide the common life of its member nations. There are many reasons why this is so. For example, the new nations in Asia have

[15] Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, *India Wins Freedom* (Bombay: Orient Longmans, 1959), p. 225.

been influenced by their former colonial ties far more than the spokesmen of the new governments are willing to acknowledge. To be sure, the historic insularity of various Asian cultures and societies was greatly broken down by the introduction of modern civilization. But each nation is jealous of its own existence, and is not emotionally open to the development of psychological fraternity with its neighbors.

By far the greatest problem for Asian nations is the internal unity of their own peoples. The difference along the political, economic, social, and cultural lines, as well as ethnic, religious, and linguistic differences, are obvious. Equally if not more persistent is the difference in mentality and outlook among the new intelligentsia, the old intelligentsia, and the masses. These categories, like all typologies, are naturally oversimplifications, and in reality there is more overlapping as well as being more subdivisions among them. Nevertheless, they may help us to clarify the existence of different images of the Asian peoples, crossing national, religious, and cultural boundary lines.

The "new intelligentsia" no longer play the decisively important role they did during the initial encounter between the East and West. Then they were the creative minority, new "priests," dedicated to re-forming the backward Asian nations and to reshaping them after the models of modern Western nations. Now, however, they are "technicians," assigned to carry on their duties in government service, in business, in education, and in other spheres in the new nations. Although they were once caught in the whirlwind of the independence movement, they now feel stifled by the atmosphere of these nations which they helped to create. Some of them have studied abroad; many were exposed to Westernized education at home. All have the capacity to look at themselves and their own nations with a sense of detachment. They are at home in either the East or the West, but they feel some distance from both of them. Both were learned and acquired cultures for them, and they cannot reject either one; they are on the borderland between the two. They may give lip service to their ancestral religious rites and participate in their own neighborhood activities, but their hearts and souls are not in them. In a sense, they envy their illiterate neighbors, who can be comforted by old gods and superstitious rituals. They respect religions and mores, but they cannot believe in them. Most of them affirm their faith in science and democracy. The sophisticated among them dream of the eventual synthesis of Eastern and Western cultures; many of them are interested in existentialism, depth psychology, Zen Buddhism, or Vedanta. Their daily life is dictated by middle-class values and mores. They have mixed feelings of admiration and fear for religiously oriented Pakistan or Communist-oriented Red China, but they hope their own nations will remain neutral and uncommitted.

Some of the new intelligentsia cannot stand the strain of holding to both Eastern and Western values, and they resort to submitting themselves to authority, such as joining the Communist party or the Christian church or embracing their ancestral faith. But an amazing number of these people find it difficult to take such a step; they cling to the borderland,

complaining about the meaninglessness of life. Many of them confess their fears of schizophrenia, high blood pressure, or ulcers. They are too proud to admit that they have no clear sense of identity.

The "old intelligentsia," too, show their emotional strain. They suffer from the discrepancy between their ideals and reality. Their grandfathers, be it recalled, during the initial period of the encounter between the East and West, categorically rejected new ideas and new ways introduced from the West. However, since that time, the old intelligentsia—the guardians of ancient religions and cultures—have been compelled to make a series of concessions to the new order of society for the sake of their own survival. But once they had installed telephones and radios in the temples and shrines, and once they had started reading the *Sacred Books of the East,* translated by Max Müller and others, they knew they were deviating from their ideals. They could still sing the Lord's song, but their tunes were contaminated by the tunes of the strange new land. Nonetheless, the old intelligentsia found a new incentive during the struggle for independence, and they commanded the respect of the masses. In resisting the Western colonial powers, even while utilizing Western technology, their inspiration had to be derived from the traditional cultures and religions. The English-educated Gandhi advocated the importance of the spinning wheel, and the baptized Christian Bandaranaike returned to the Buddhist fold. With the goal of political independence in view, the old intelligentsia envisaged a glorious future for themselves and for the ideals they represented.

Now, however, they are horrified to realize that their own camp is not so solidly united as they thought it was. Some of the right-wing purists are under the happy illusion that history can be undone and that the pristine past can be realized. But how can they part with and forget all the experiences and the values accumulated in the meantime? And where can they find the pristine past? Denouncing modern inventions and modern misunderstandings of their past makes wonderful oratory, but it cannot be done in actual practice. The more progressive wing of the old intelligentsia, on the other hand, also suffer from a romantic illusion in claiming that their religions and cultures not only can cope with science and democracy but can also save the world from destruction and despair. The progressive elements of the old intelligentsia have all the marks of the new intelligentsia, except that they know which side of the fence they are on. They are afraid to look at themselves in the mirror for fear that they might find a very different (and Westernized) image. So they are on the defensive, although they appear on the surface to be taking a positive stand. For example, spokesmen of Eastern religions often claim that their religions are the most scientific, because, so they say, what is not scientific is not truly Buddhistic, Hinduistic, or Islamic, respectively. Today the old intelligentsia, both the conservative and the progressive wings, covet the position of leadership for the new cultures and societies in Asia.

The term "masses" is an ambiguous one, usually referring to the large body of people who do not have a self-conscious intellectual orientation, old or new, and

who live close to nature. That they are not educated does not mean that they are not intelligent. Their culture is based on accumulated wisdom, handed down from generation to generation in their families, villages, and communities. The basic difference between the masses and the intelligentsia is that the former experience the meaning of life but do not reflect on it. Of course this pattern varies greatly in different parts of Asia. The situation in Japan, for example, with an almost complete literacy rate, cannot be compared with some of the Southeast Asian countries. But even in Japan the rural people preserve many of the mass qualities. Traditionally, the masses in Asia had their own small worlds. Political events had little direct meaning for them. The village was a social and residential unit, and it was the focus of their identification. Villagers lived together for many generations, and their time-honored way of doing things kept order and promoted orderly conduct in the village. Dr. R. Panikkar, a scholarly Roman Catholic priest who has a rare ability to feel the spirit of Hinduism, emphasizes that a man in traditional Hinduism feels a cosmic bond with the Cause, Principle, or Source of this very Cosmos. "His religion is a cosmic religion and his life a chthonic life. His actions are ultimately motivated by his ideas, not even by his human instincts, but by telluric forces, by the rhythm of the earth, by the dynamism of the whole world in which he simply plays a role."[16]

Masses in other parts of Asia share with traditional Hindus the attitude of accepting life as it is and also the belief that the whole process of the world, including their own destinies, is ordained by supraworldly forces of some kind. For the masses, religion pervades all dimensions of human life, because for them there is no difference between the sacred and the secular. "Fear is there and fascination also, but if you happen to believe in evil spirits and you see and hear them every day and you know that your headache of the last ten days is due to one of them, you continue to be careful, but not so much terrified."[17]

In the modern period the Asian masses experienced a number of shock treatments. The old order crumbled, and they had to make an adjustment to the new. Various spokesmen claimed that they were speaking for, and on behalf of, the masses, but they had little understanding of what the masses were really thinking. Although the masses were long-suffering and reluctant to voice their opinions, they learned by experience both the advantages and the disadvantages of the new type of social relations. For example, they were fascinated by the use of money, which was both a curse and a blessing to them. With money they could buy anything, and without money they could not maintain their self-respect. In the modern world, individuals and families had to look after themselves. "With the increase in population, and the breakdown of traditional patterns of behaviour, new lands which had been set aside for communal grazing or fuel or sanitary arrangements were appropriated by individual villagers, and individual villagers

[16] R. Panikkar, "Some Phenomenological Aspects of Hindu Spirituality Today," *Oriental Thought* (n.d.), p. 183.

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 186.

interfered, for instance, with the irrigation with a view to their own profit only, even when this caused damage to the whole village."[18]

The independence movements in various parts of Asia became powerful political forces when both the old and the new intelligentsia developed a rapport with the masses. Oppressed by colonial authorities, the intelligentsia identified their lot with that of the masses, whom they had hitherto looked down upon. In their rhapsody for the future the revolutionary leaders were inclined to promise the masses the pie in the sky and to demand from the masses in turn their wholehearted participation in the common struggle. The masses were no longer masses, blissful in their ignorance; the masses were people, comrades-in-arms, collective Messiahs. This view was dramatically worded by Sun Yat-sen in his "Three Peoples' Principles":

San Min Chu I (Three Peoples' Principles)
Our aim shall be
To found a free land;
World Peace be our stand.
Lead on, comrades;
Vanguards ye are!
Hold fast your aim
By sun and star!
Be earnest and brave
Your country to save.
One heart, one soul;
One mind, one goal![19]

Thus, during the struggle for political independence, temporarily at least, the masses had a clear image of who they were and what they were. This new sense of self-identity, coupled with their new economic needs and wants, was like an explosive charge put into their minds; it has exploded already in many parts of Asia, and it will continue to explode from now on.

[18] Mead, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

[19] Translated by Tu Ting-hsiu.

NATIONALISM AND RELIGIONS

It is difficult to appreciate the magnitude of the problems that confront the peoples of Asia today. There are two types of "priests," who feel the vocation to guide their people and provide them with a new image of themselves. They are the political leaders and the religious leaders. Parenthetically, political leaders sometimes include ecclesiastics, as in Ceylon; and religious leaders include many laymen, as in Burma. In times of crisis they have been able to work together, and in times of peace they try to complement each other, but not always with success. Both groups address themselves, on the one hand, to their own people, and, on the other, to the world at large. To outsiders, nationalism and Eastern religions seem to be inseparable, and in some cases this is true. But, more often than not, there is a fine point of difference between them in the sense that political leaders tend to conceive religion politically, while religious leaders approach nationalism religiously. When their interests do not coincide, ecclesiastics may be silenced by the law, or the political leader may be shot by religious fanatics. Both groups know that they are dealing with the explosive dynamic power of the masses. "In Asia," says Adlai Stevenson, "the masses now count for something. Tomorrow, they will count for more. And, for better or for worse, the future belongs to those who understand the hopes and fears of masses in ferment. . . . The people want

respect—and something to eat every day. And they want something better for their children."[20]

Who can help the masses in ferment to realize this new vision? Understandably, political leaders, who have led the people through the painful struggle for independence, assume this role; their formula is nationalism. It is not only the problem of restoring national dress, national language, national monuments, and national economy; the whole national spirit, the pride and dignity of the people, is at stake. Religion, too, plays a significant role in this respect. For example, in the words of U Kyaw Thet: "Painfully aware that their national pride—even their continued existence—was manifestly debatable, the Burmese had to produce something tangible and traditional to justify their future as a separate entity. They found what they needed in Buddhism."[21] Many religious groups and institutions have benefited in this situation, even in Communist China, where some of the old monasteries have been restored as national monuments.

There are many religious leaders who for their part are keenly aware of the important role religion has to play in the formation of new nations. Adherents of religions are not citizens only, and as such have to do their share, but religion can provide the moral incentive which is so badly needed for the growth of national families. To be a Japanese means to be a Shintoist or a Buddhist, to be a Filipino means to be a Roman Catholic, to be a Thai or a Burmese means to be a Buddhist, to be an Indian means to be a Hindu, and to be a Pakistani or an Indonesian means to be a Muslim. Such a simple equation between nation and religion, sanctioned by many political and religious leaders, has a powerful appeal to the masses in ferment. It was no surprise to me that several of the political leaders I met in Southeast Asia were most appreciative of religion as the moral and spiritual fabric of their national life.

The tragedy of Asia is that nationalism has emerged at a time when it is no longer adequate for guiding the explosive dynamics of the people in Asia. It is tragic, because nationalism alone was capable of liberating people from the yoke of colonialism, and yet beyond this goal it ran into a blind alley. For a decade or two after the independence, a residual prestige and inertia may enable nationalism to preserve its vitality, but the very problems which nationalism promised to solve for the masses cannot be solved solely on nationalistic terms.

> The revolutionary presures go far beyond the matter of national independence to the issues of the whole social structure, relations on the land and between classes, the terms and methods of economic development. . . They are soluble no longer within the confines of separate national economies; a new world economy is wanted. Thus the great forces in motion move blindly toward some new coherence.[22]

Now that they have attained a new sense of national identity, for which they are grateful to nationalist ideology, people in

[20] *Chicago Sun-Times,* September 4, 1953.

[21] U Kyaw Thet, "Continuity in Burma—the Survival of Historical Forces," *Atlantic,* CCI, No. 3 (February, 1958), 118.

[22] Harold R. Isaacs, "The Dimensions of the Crisis: Asia's Multiple Revolution," *Saturday Review of Literature,* XXXIV (August 4, 1951), 14.

Asia are beginning to demand a new social identity. They are no longer satisfied to stay at the bottom of the ladder, even if the top positions are held by their fellow nationals. They want to improve their lot; they insist on correcting unjust social relations, modernizing production, and securing equal opportunities. In this atmosphere, nationalism not only fails to give a vision of national unity but begets a "communalism" which further divides the national family. The Dravidians and the Scheduled Class (untouchables) in India, Tamils in Ceylon, Karens in Burma, and Tibetans in Communist China are but few examples of the disgruntled minority groups in Asia. Governments may pacify the people by promising miracles through a five-year plan or a ten-year plan, but the people are beginning to be dangerously impatient with such gradualism. Nehru is reported to have commented that "India's liberal Constitution will only last if the Indian economic plan can engender a sense of economic progress at least equal to that of China."[23]

Many of the Westernized Asian intelligentsia cling to democratic principles as the answer to the revolutionary situation in Asia. Hopefully, they point out the similarities between the independence of the young republic in North America and the independence of their own countries. But the American Revolution was not the product of a nationalistic spirit or of a philosophy of democracy. The genius of American politics, says Professor Boorstin, is due to the "seamlessness" of its culture. Democracy in the American sense is not a philosophy; it is only a pragmatic, regulative principle which enables men and groups of different beliefs and persuasions to live together. "If we have learned anything from our history, it is the wisdom of allowing institutions to develop according to the needs of each particular environment; and the value of both environmentalism and traditionalism as principles of political life, as a way of saving ourselves from the imbecilities, the vagaries, and the cosmic enthusiasms of individual men."[24] As regulative principles, democracy is important for Asia, but the types of democracy which should develop depends largely on what contents are envisaged in their objectives; democratic means, however important, cannot create the image of the future for the people in Asia.

That Asians need a new sense of self-identity is well recognized. Many new nations in Asia subscribe to democratic principles as a means to regulate their political affairs, even though the meaning of democracy is interpreted differently in various countries. The crucial question is the creative vision of the future. Here the romantic conservatives, traditionalists, and rightists each make a bid, hoping to restore their peoples' past glory, and their proposals are supported by religious and cultural conservatives, medievalists, and classicists. The measures they are willing to employ in order to restore the past may be modern, that is, the use of mass media of communication, but they draw their inspiration primarily from the archaic, mythological past of their peoples. By separating ideals from history, and by

[23] Quoted in the *Manchester Guardian,* December 28, 1954.

[24] Daniel J. Boorstin, *The Genius of American Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 185–86.

ascribing eternal values, as it were, to the past, divorced from the contamination of the realm of history, these "prophets" of past glory can mercilessly denounce the present. We saw in the recent history of Japan how such "prophets" of past glory, when they secured political power and military weapons, were able to sway the imagination of disgruntled peoples. And, today, Asian nations are plagued by many religious, cultural, and political movements which are critical of the government and which want to restore the mythological past. Although they are harmless minorities in times of peace, these groups may quickly influence the masses in times of crisis.

Fortunately for Asia, as well as for the whole world, many of the first-generation revolutionaries, such as Sun Yat-sen and Gandhi, were world citizens as much as nationalist leaders. Under their leadership, the architects of the new nations in Asia committed their policies and constitutions to such principles as the social welfare state and the peaceful coexistence of all nations of the world. On the eve of the attainment of independence, Nehru stated in the Constituent Assembly:

> Long ago we made a tryst with destiny, and now the time comes when we shall redeem our pledge, not wholly or in full measure, but very substantially. At the stroke of the midnight hour, when the world sleeps, India will awake to life and freedom. . . . It is fitting that at this solemn moment we take the pledge of dedication to the service of India and her people to the still larger cause of humanity.[25]

In such a crucial turning point, which comes rarely in history, the nationalist leaders were able to superimpose very progressive measures and constitutions on their people, who had little understanding of what these constitutions meant. The irony is that people in Asia earned their political freedom, but they did not earn the liberal political principles which were given to them. Hence the emotional distance between the governments and their peoples. The situation is even further complicated in that the first-generation revolutionaries, who were oriented to the world community, are dying out, leaving a big question mark as to who, or what types of leaders, will take their places. Already President Sukarno makes it very plain that the democracy Asia has adopted is too Western; parliamentary democracy is not in harmony with the Indonesian atmosphere, and excesses are bound to occur—excesses such as the misuse of the idea of opposition in the political field, violation of discipline in the military field, and corruption in the socio-economic field.

Events move quickly in Asia today. Border troubles, revolutions, and counter-revolutions will continue to occur. Urbanization, industrialization, and mass education will change the face of Asia as time goes on. On the other hand, millions of people still believe today that penicillin or quinine, for instance, cure diseases because of the presiding deity of each plant or because of the spiritual power of the person utilizing the remedies.[26] In this complex situation, in which various stages of human history exist side by side, revolutionary forces move around almost aimlessly, looking for a direction and a coher-

[25] *Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches* (New Delhi: Government of India, Publication Division, 1949), I, 25.

[26] Panikkar, *op. cit.*, p. 185.

ence. The old type of nationalism, which has guided Asians thus far, can no longer serve as a guiding principle for people who are looking for some sort of a new order of social fabric and yet are not willing to part with their spiritual and cultural traditions. The combination of religiously conceived nationalism and politically conceived religions may fill the need of the people for the time being, but not for very long. Romantic dreams of restoring the pristine past can spell out what is wrong with the present socio-political order, but they cannot give the people resources for interpreting their contemporary experiences and relating them to the vision of the future. For lack of alternatives, many Asian youths are attracted by communism.[27] One unforgettable moment for me was seeing the headquarters of the Nepalese Communist party right next to a lovely old Buddhist temple at Kathumandhu. What struck me was the contrast between the predominantly old worshipers at the temple and the predominantly young men and women who were going in and out of the party headquarters.

But nationalism is far from being dead, and Eastern religions certainly are not spiritually bankrupt. There are significant trends among some people in various parts of Asia toward grasping the meaning of their contemporary experiences. States Nehru:

> We seek no narrow nationalism. Nationalism has a place in each country and should be fostered, but it must not be allowed to become aggressive and come in the way of international development. Asia stretches her hand out in friendship to Europe and America as well as to our suffering brethren in Africa. . . . The freedom that we envisage is not to be confined to this nation or to a particular people, but must spread out over the whole human race. That universal human freedom also cannot be based on the supremacy of any particular class. It must be the freedom of the comman man everywhere and full opportunities for him to develop.[28]

Thus Nehru and many others like him try to reinterpret the meaning of nationalism, and they attempt to follow what might be termed a "dynamic neutralism" in international affairs. In the philosophical domain, Eastern philosophies are re-examined and reinterpreted from a world-wide perspective. Radhakrishnan, for example, reinterprets the Hindu doctrine of *maya* (usually translated as illusion): "The world of everyday events and things is not ultimate reality, to be sure, but neither is it unreality. He has defended the reality of the empirical world; it finds its basis in the Absolute."[29] Similarly, Professor Hajime Tanabe, rejecting the "as well as" of the speculative synthesis of Hegel and the "either/or" of the ethical earnestness of Kiergegaard, insists that the true dialectic is a "thoroughgoing negativity of our immediacy (the repentance of one's radical sin) by the mercy of the Absolute, who also negates Himself for the sake of Love and Mercy."[30] In the religious sphere a new spirit is observable in the world-wide missionary

[27] Cf. Joseph M. Kitagawa, "Christianity, Communism, and the Asian Revolution," *World Dominion,* XXXIII (July–August, 1955), 199–206.

[28] *Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches,* I, 304–5.

[29] Radhakrishnan and C. A. Moore (eds.), *A Source Book of Indian Philosophy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 610.

[30] Yoshinori Takeuchi, "Buddhism and Existentialism," in *Religion and Culture—Essays in Honor of Paul Tillich,* p. 301.

movements of Islam, the Ramakrishna Order of Hinduism, and Buddhism. Some of the younger Asian Christians are also trying to re-examine and reformulate their own beliefs and practices in the light of their contemporary experiences.

However, these new trends in various dimensions have not as yet related themselves to each other, nor have they related themselves to the revolutionary aspirations of the masses in Asia. Indian delegates may gain respect at the United Nations, but their government may lose votes at home. Radhakrishnans and Tanabes may influence college students, but they exert little influence on the actual life of the common people. Despite the much-publicized "resurgence" and "reformation" of Eastern religions, many religionists are not willing to face the present and the future. For example, reformers in Ceylon complain that

> the Buddhist hides from the realities behind a barrier of well-meaning phrases, and concentrates so largely on the need for Love and Kindness that he ignores the inevitability of conflict with the reactionary elements. . . . The Buddhist is so entangled in the claims of tradition that he is a stranger in the world of current politics.[31]

What is significant, though, is that there are creative and revolutionary elements among the intellectuals, political leaders, religious leaders, and the masses. Once, during the period of the political struggle for independence, they were all united as comrades-in-arms and collective Messiahs. Can they be united again in the near future? The collective suffering servants in Asia today are paralyzed just as much by poverty and outmoded social relationships as by the lack of a central focus.

It is difficult to sort out numerous and diverse impressions and formulate a coherent picture of the contemporary Asians. To whatever one says about them, others can find contradictions and exceptions. One thing is clear, however. They are passionately Asians in the messianic sense, even though their message is still ambiguous and lacks cohesion. They are more articulate in their criticisms of the West than about themselves. In 1956 the *New York Times* stated that Christians are now "paying a price, not for their teaching, but for not consistently practicing what they preach." That may be so; at least many Asians still find it difficult to feel that the religion of the European regiments of occupation during the colonial era could be their own faith. Theoretically, one may argue this point. But it is not confirmed by Asian experiences of the immediate past, of those years of humiliation and suffering. And, yet, Asians are by and large free from malice toward other peoples and religions. Their anti-Westernism and anti-Christian attitude can be traced to something much deeper, although they may not be conscious of it. That is, the Asians' attitude toward the West—that strange combination of resentment and admiration—is due to the fact that they are compelled to live in a world which is no longer Asian in the traditional sense of the term. The Western "oppressors" are gone, but they cannot throw away the "modernity" which is reshaping Asian societies and cultures with a secular science and a secular interpretation of state and law.[32]

[31] *The Revolt in the Temple* (Colombo: Sinha Publications, 1953), p. 604.

[32] William E. Hocking, *The Coming World Civilization* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1956), p. 4.

"Modernity," the legacy of the West, has irresistibly permeated all aspects of their lives. On the other hand, what are they contributing, or what can they contribute, to the West? Arts, poetry, and spirituality, yes! But these reach only a tiny segment of Westerners. They have not as yet found that unique quality with which Asia can confront the West. They are certain that they have something, but not yet sure what it is. Meanwhile, the Messiahs are frustrated because of the vagueness of their message. This may account for their use of such generalities as the "spiritual East" and the "materialistic West."

A spokesman at the Buddha Jayanti (1959) in Tokyo stated: "The modernization of the non-West is something beyond westernization and its process is very tortuous. If we are not creative, we may be assimilated to western civilization. But if we are vital and creative, we may have a narrow escape. We must find a creative way."[33] This sentiment is expressed in various other parts of Asia as well.

> The question is whether in the end the man of the East will have lost himself, whether he will be hopelessly subservient to the spirit of the West or whether he will emerge from the encounter a new man, who has found the way to a peculiar, creative reshaping of his life, as a nation and as a person. In this sense it is a question of life or death. Only as a new man can the man of the East dominate the tremendous crisis which has come on him and which in breadth and depth is unparalleled in the history of mankind.[34]

This is not a problem for Asians alone, however. What happens in Asia will influence the course of history of the entire world. Will Asians find a creative way, a clear image of themselves, and a new sense of self-identity in this turbulent era?

JOSEPH M. KITAGAWA

[33] Shinn Yamamoto, "The Tragedy of Westernization" (Tokyo: Buddha Jayanti, 1959).

[34] Walter Freytag, *Spiritual Revolution in the East,* trans. L. M. Stalker (London: Lutterworth Press, 1940), pp. 18–19.

FACULTY NEWS

JOSEPH M. KITAGAWA, Assistant Professor of History of Religions, lectured on "The Church in the Modern World" at Colorado College, Colorado Springs, for the College Work Division of the Episcopal church in August. On September 25–27 Mr. Kitagawa contributed a paper on "The Implications of Buddhist Ethics for International Relations" for the conference of the Church Peace Union held at Princeton University. His recent publications include: "Reappraisal of the Church-related University in Japan," *Journal of Christian Studies* (Kyoto), September, 1959; two articles on "Beikoku Shukyogaku no Tembo" ("The Science of Religion in North America"), *Shukyo Kenkyu* ("Journal of Religious Studies") (Tokyo), Vol. XXXI, No. 158 (Spring, 1959), and *ibid.,* Vol. XXXII, No. 159 (Summer, 1959); and "Kyokai no Shodai-sei" ("Early Church and the Church in Asia"), *Mominoki* (Kyoto), "Trinity Issue," 1959. With Mircea Eliade, Professor of History of Religions, Mr. Kitagawa has co-edited the book

History of Religions: Essays in Method, which will be published soon by the University of Chicago Press.

PERRY D. LEFEVRE, Associate Professor of Theology and Education, led a workshop for independent-school teachers at the Cranbrook School, Bloomfield Hills, Michigan, on "The Conquest of Inner Space," August 30–September 3. Also in September he addressed the faculty of Concordia Senior College, Fort Wayne, Indiana; presented a paper on "Value Issues in the Social Sciences" to a faculty seminar at South Dakota State College; and spoke three times to the Faculty Christian Fellowship of South Dakota.

JOHN W. MONTGOMERY, Swift Hall Librarian and Instructor in Theological Bibliography, has had a booklet, *The Writing of Research Papers in Theology: An Introductory Lecture, with a List of 150 Basic Reference Tools for the Theological Student,* published (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Edwards Brothers, Inc., October, 1959). Also published, in the September–October, 1959, issue of *Religious Education,* is his *"The Chronicles of Narnia* [by C. S. Lewis] and the Adolescent Reader."

JAROSLAV J. PELIKAN, Professor of Historical Theology, and author of the prize-winning book *The Riddle of Roman Catholicism,* told a luncheon group at the University Club in downtown Chicago: "I wrote this book because I believe the time has come to end the cold war among Christians. For too long both Roman Catholics and Protestants have been content to recite slogans about their side and to repeat slanders about the other side, even though neither the slogans nor the slanders were true any more—if, indeed, they ever were. There are many indications on both sides that in place of slogans and slanders both sides want dialogue; and *The Riddle of Roman Catholicism* is, I hope, a serious and responsible effort to get the dialogue going." The luncheon marked the formal presentation to Professor Pelikan of a check for $12,500 for his manuscript. The award was made by Emory Bucke, senior editor, Abingdon Press, Nashville. The Abingdon Prize was established to encourage the writing of books of outstanding merit in the broad field of Christianity. Professor Pelikan's book was the prize-winner among 125 manuscripts submitted.

W. ALVIN PITCHER, Assistant Professor of Ethics and Society, recently served as moderator of "All Things Considered" for discussion of Lloyd Warner's recent book, *The Living and the Dead,* and was a retreat leader of the Methodist Theological Fellowship and the Roger Williams Fellowship at the University of Indiana. He addressed the University of Illinois YMCA Faculty on the subject "A New Theological Critique of Affluent Society," and he addressed the Philosophy Club of Northern Baptist Theological Seminary on "A New Direction for Christian Ethics." After speaking on "The Church and Urban Problems" at the Woodlawn Immanuel Church and North Park Covenant Church, Chicago, he also participated in a workshop at the National Catholic Social Action Conference on "Urban Renewal and the Church." Professor Pitcher's recent publication is *Eth-*

ics and the Executive Life (Industrial Relations Center, University of Chicago).

J. Coert Rylaarsdam, Professor of Old Testament Theology, participated in the Service of Dedication of the First Congregational Church, Rock Falls, Illinois, on Sunday, September 27, 1959. Minister of the church is Russell L. Fate (B.D. '50).

Nathan A. Scott, Jr., Associate Profossor of Theology and Literature, recently addressed a dinner meeting of the faculty of Hope College in Holland, Michigan. The National Council of the Episcopal church has reprinted as one of its "Faculty Papers" the essay of Professor Scott that appeared in the Summer, 1959, issue of the *Chicago Review,* "The Broken Center: A Definition of the Crisis of Values in Modern Literature."

William N. Weaver, Assistant Dean of the Federated Theological Faculty, gave the sermon at the Installation Service of the Reverend John Hollowell (B.D. '52) at the Congregational Church, Geneva, Illinois, on September 20, 1959.

Allen P. Wikgren, Associate Professor of New Testament Language and Literature, spent the month of August working with an International Committee on New Testament text in St. Andrews, Scotland. In September he attended sessions of the Society for New Testament Studies in Norwich, England, and carried out some research on New Testament manuscripts in British libraries.

ALUMNI NEWS

Thomasine Allen (M.A. '28) was awarded an honorary degree of Doctor of Humane Letters by her alma mater, Franklin College, Indiana, at the 1959 commencement exercises. The degree was granted *in absentia,* as Miss Allen has built herself a home in Kuji, Japan, where she will be supervising a new agricultural project that has been her dream for years.

Ralph E. Bayes ('26 and '29) has been minister of the Mariners' House, Boston, since 1931, carrying on the work inaugurated by the illustrious Father Taylor. Last year Mr. Bayes visited the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and is currently serving as *ad interim* minister of the Congregational Church, Wilmington, Massachusetts.

Edwin F. Bohmfalk ('34–'38) has recently completed his six-year term as district superintendent of the Fort Worth District, West, Central Methodist Conference, and has been appointed to the pastorate of the Austin Avenue Methodist Church, Waco, Texas.

Claude D. Dicks (Ph.D. '47), Parsons College, Fairfield, Iowa, had his book *The Christian Religion* published on September 16, 1959. The book is designed for use in college freshman-level courses in religion.

Raymond H. Ewing (M.A. '29) and his wife Ruth (M.A. '21) have resigned as pastors of the McCone County Parish, Circle, Montana, and have moved to Staples, Minnesota. The Ewings served the parish, which they organized, for five years. This year marks forty-five years of Christian service for Mr. Ewing, and ten years since Mrs. Ewing was ordained

to the Congregational ministry, although she was licensed to preach forty years ago.

Roy W. Fairchild (M.A. '47), professor of Christian education at San Francisco Theological Seminary, San Anselmo, California, is engaged in a three-year research project on "Family Life and Ministry to Families" in the United Presbyterian Church, U.S.A. He is also preparing the preliminary report to the 171st General Asembly of that denomination.

Jean Whitman Gilpatrick ('50) has moved to Sweet Briar College, Sweet Briar, Virginia, where her husband, Thomas, has accepted a post as assistant professor of government as of September 1, 1959.

Valerie Goldstein (M.A. '58), who returned to graduate study at Union-Columbia this past year, has been appointed instructor in religion at Hobart College in Geneva, New York.

George Gordh (Ph.D. '41), professor of religion at Hollins College, Virginia, will be on a sabbatical leave this coming year, working on a book on Christian theology. He spent the summer at Cambridge and will go to Crozer Theological Seminary, where, this fall, he will be a part-time lecturer in Christian history.

Ernest B. Harper ('16–'22) retired as director of the School of Social Work, Michigan State University, on June 30, 1959. On leave during 1959–60 as visiting professor to the School of Social Work at the University of Hawaii, Honolulu, he will return to Michigan State University in September, 1960, as professor of social work for two more years.

Elmer Higdon (B.D. '30) and his wife Idelia ('30) returned to Indianapolis, Indiana, last October (1958) after a post-retirement term of twenty-eight months in Union Theological Seminary of the Philippines and the Protestant Center on the campus of the State University of the Philippines. Mrs. Higdon taught church history in the Seminary, and Mr. Higdon served as minister-chaplain at the Center. In January, 1959, they joined the staff of the International Missionary Council in New York, where they did research for five and a half months. On September 9 they returned to the Philippines under the appointment of the United Presbyterian Board of Missions as visiting professors to Silliman University, five hundred miles southeast of Manila.

J. Clay Madison (1933–40) is currently serving as superintendent of the Greensboro, North Carolina, District of the Methodist church.

Robert S. Mathes (1931–32) had an honorary Doctor of Divinity degree conferred upon him by Heidelberg College, Tiffin, Ohio, at the June 7, 1959, commencement.

Sterling W. McHarg (B.D. '56) resigned his post as minister of the Norris Religious Fellowship, Norris, Tennessee, as of August 31, 1959, to accept a call to the pastorate of the Community Church, Gunnison, Colorado.

Milton D. McLean (M.A. '31) has served as co-ordinator of religious affairs

and as director of the Religious Affairs Center at Ohio State University since 1948. During the last three years Mr. McLean has served on the Centennial Commission of student religious work at the University of Michigan as chairman of their conference program and a member of the editorial committee for their centennial volume, *Religion and the State Universities,* which was published by the University of Michigan in September.

Grace D. Phillips (B.D. '23) has moved to Los Angeles, California, from Denver, Colorado, where she has served as librarian of Temple Emanuel for the last twelve years.

Katherine Putnam (M.A. '28), after serving thirty-three years as a missionary to China, has retired to the Leamy Home, an Episcopal church home in Philadelphia.

Arnold B. Rhodes (Ph.D. '51) is an assistant editor of the "Layman's Bible Commentary," published in October by the U.S. Presbyterian's John Knox Press in Richmond, Virginia. It has been described as one of the most significant publication projects of the denomination's history. Specifically designed for laymen's use, this "Commentary" will be distributed over the entire English-speaking world. Negotiations are progressing for possible translations into Spanish, Portuguese, Japanese, and various African dialects. The twenty-five-book series features noted Bible scholars from both this country and abroad and of widespread denominational backgrounds. Five books will appear this year. *The Introduction to the Bible* (Vol. I) will be used by the Presbyterian church, U.S., in a denomination-wide study during 1960. One of its five sections, "The Message of the Bible," which surveys the importance of the Bible's revelation from Adam and Eve through the New Testament church, was written by Dr. Rhodes.

Mary Edith Runyan (M.A. '45) left for New Delhi, India, on August 19, on a Fulbright research grant for study of Indian philosophy and religion for a year. This past summer she served as director of the Leadership School at Union Theological Seminary.

Robert W. Sonen ('36–'39) has been called to the pastorate of the First Unitarian Church, Miami, Florida, effective September 1, 1959. Mr. Sonen has served as minister of the All Souls Unitarian Church, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for the last fifteen years.

Owen M. Weatherly (Ph. D. '52) has had his book *The Fulfillment of Life* published by John Knox Press, Richmond, Virginia, on September 28. This book discusses the divinely ordained laws of truth, kindness, faith, liberty, righteousness, and love. It illustrates how each of these laws is right and best for man. Mr. Weatherly is currently serving as pastor of historic First Baptist Church in Philadelphia (organized in 1698).

David Yu (Ph.D. '59) has accepted a post at Bluefield State College, Bluefield, West Virginia, where he will teach courses in religion, effective September, 1959.

Edward K. Ziegler ('46) is currently serving as moderator, Church of the Brethren, for 1959–60 and will preside

over the General Conference at Urbana, Illinois, in June, 1960. Mr. Ziegler had his book *The Village Pastor—His Role and Training in Tomorrow's World* published in July, 1959, by Agricultural Missions, Inc.

In Memoriam

William S. Abernethy (1896–1900), eighty-six, died in Washington, D.C., on August 17, following a long illness. A funeral service was held Thursday, August 20, at Calvary Baptist Church, where Dr. Abernethy was pastor from 1921 until his retirement in 1942. A minister since 1899, Dr. Abernethy, who was President Harding's pastor, remained active in the pulpit during his retirement until three years ago. He made occasional visits to the Calvary pulpit and was a supply pastor for Baptist churches along the East Coast. Prior to his pastorate at Calvary, Dr. Abernethy was pastor of First Baptist Church, Kansas City, Missouri (1912–21), and in Berwyn, Illinois (1899–1912). He was president of the American Baptist Home Mission Society (1917–18); a member of the board of managers of the American Baptist Foreign Mission Society, which he served as president (1921–23); and a member of the Executive Committee of the Baptist World Alliance. He was twenty-fourth president of the American (then Northern) Baptist Convention, serving one term in 1933–34. From 1935 to 1936 he was chairman of the Evangelistic Department of the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, forerunner of the National Council of Churches of Christ in the U.S.A. He was war-work secretary with the YMCA in occupied regions of France from September, 1918, until March, 1919.

A published collection of Dr. Abernethy's sermons, entitled *"Left-handed Folks,* reveals some of his favorite topics. They are about people who learn to recover from handicaps. As a student, Dr. Abernethy had overcome a serious speech impediment which might have kept him from the pulpit.

He is survived by his wife, Jane, to whom he was married nearly sixty years; and two sons, Theodore J., a Washington physician, and Bradford S., a chaplain at Rutgers University. Another son, Robert, died in 1933.

Katherine Johnson (M.A. '29) died on May 21, 1959, in Jackson, Mississippi, at the home of her sister, Mrs. G. Roland Sims. Miss Johnson served as a missionary in Japan, teaching at the Hiroshima Girls' School, from 1922 to 1941. She was dean of women at Wesleyan College in Macon, Georgia, from 1941 to 1945, and professor of English there from 1945 to 1954. For the past four years, until her retirement in January, Miss Johnson was executive secretary for the Interboard Committee for Christian Work in Japan and Okinawa, with headquarters in New York City.

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The Divinity School, in order to keep alumni information up to date, will print this Change of Information Form on the back cover of each issue of the *Divinity School News*. The form is for your convenience. Please use it when you have a change of address or a new position or if you have an interesting project under way. We need your co-operation in receiving this information promptly.

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